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1. Introduction
Synesthesia corresponds to a condition in which “stimulation in one sensory or cognitive 
stream leads to associated experiences in a second, unstimulated stream” (Hubbard, 2007, 
p. 193). It has also been characterized as a “startling sensory blending” (Cytowic, 1997, p. 
17)  “not  experienced by most  people under  comparable  conditions”  (Grossenbacher  & 
Lovelace, 2001, p. 36). The first  medical account came from George Sachs (1812), an 
albino and synesthete,  who describes at  the end of his  medical  dissertation how black 
letters appear to him in various shades (quoted by Ward, 2008). Previous mentions, more 
or less akin to thought experiments, are found in Locke (1690) and Leibniz (1765) who 
report of a blind man for whom thinking of the color scarlet is like hearing “the sound of a 
trumpet”. Later, Fechner (1871; followed by Galton, 1880) published more general surveys 
of colored letters, also known as “photisms”. Since these early studies, the initial source of 
puzzlement has remained the same. What is particularly distinctive of synesthetes is their 
ability to give consistent pairings of apparently unrelated sensory attributes, like letters and 
colors, over a very long stretch of time (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Rich et al., 20052). This 
ability  seems  to  go  beyond  what  normal  memory  can  achieve  and  suggests  that  the 
associations  are  not  random.  This  is  what  leads  to  accept  the  existence  of  a  specific 
experiential basis for these associations.
What sort  of experience do synesthetes  have when they report  black letters being red, 
green or yellow? How can we explain some persons seeing colors when they hear sounds 
or  musical  notes?  Synesthesia  raises  both  broad  questions  about  the  exact  nature  of 
conscious  experience  as  well  as  more  technical  challenges  to  philosophical  models  of 
perception and mental processes. Take the example of D. (mentioned in Ortmann, 1933) 
for whom B2 is green; that is, she has an experience of green whenever she hears B2. The 
problem here is not merely that D's experience is different from that of others’ but that it is 
at odds with reality: The green she experiences is not a sign that the note out there is really  
green. What can this experience be about then? Does it attribute an illusory color property 
to the sound? Does it have any representational content at all? Synesthetic experiences, as 
1The two authors equally contributed to this work.
2This is known as the “test of genuineness”. The same participants’ inducer-concurrent 
pairings are tested and re-tested after a long period of time. For example, in Baron-Cohen 
et al.’s (1993) study, synesthetes gave 92% of consistent replies when given an unexpected 
retest after one year, compared to 38% of consistency for control participants retested with 
warning after one week (see Deroy & Auvray, forthcoming, for a discussion on the validity 
of this test).
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we start to see, do not easily fit in the dominant representationalist framework (Alter, 2006; 
Gray,  2001-a;  Wager,  1999,  2001).  The  same  is  true  for  functionalism:  like  other 
perceivers, D. also sees green when she looks at leaves and grass. What is puzzling is that 
her green experience sometimes seems to result from auditory stimulation and, other times, 
from visual  stimulation.  Supposing that experiencing green constitutes a single kind of 
mental state (a kind of phenomenal, conscious state), this leads to admit that the same kind 
of  state  arises  from two  distinct  streams  and  occupies  two  irreconcilable  roles  in  D's 
cognitive  system,  which  appears  to  contradict  the  functionalist  principles  (Gray  et  al., 
1997, 2002, see also Macpherson, 2007, for a discussion). Finally, synesthetic cases like 
D’s  also  challenge  models  of  mental  architecture,  that  is  the  modular,  impenetrable 
character of perception (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Gray, 2001-b; Segal, 1997) and the neat 
individuation of the senses (Keeley, forthcoming). If visual experiences of color can result 
from auditory stimulation, the senses might not be as separated – or easy to individuate – 
as usually posited. 
Synesthesia has thus been taken as a serious source of objections to standard theories of 
perception and mental processes. Most, if not all, of these philosophical objections have 
been advanced on the basis of three main general assumptions, noticeably that synesthesia 
is:  (1) a single, more or less unified,  condition; whereby (2) some individuals have an 
additional experience, adjoined to normal perceptual experience; and that (3) this teaches 
us something about non-synesthetic perception.
 
The aim of this chapter is to offer a critical look at these three assumptions, which, as we 
shall see, appear more and more fragile once we consider the variety of cases and their 
more comprehensive studies. This has important consequences regarding the reality and 
scope  of  the  philosophical  challenges  posed  by  synesthesia,  to  which  we  return  in 
conclusion.
1. Characterizing synesthesia: a unified kind or a variety of phenomena?
1.1. Cataloging the cases
Synesthesia has long been seen as a natural kind, but it comes in range of sub-species. 
Since Sachs (1812) and Fechner (1871), synesthesia has been primarily studied through the 
induction of atypical color experiences by speech – be it read, heard or both. But other 
forms of synesthesia do not involve colors or linguistic items: digits or months of the year 
can elicit certain locations in space (Galton, 1880; Sagiv et al., 2006), words can induce 
taste sensations in the mouth and tastes can trigger tactile shape sensations: for instance, 
the word 'jail'  tastes of cold, hard bacon, for J. (Ward & Simner, 2003) and chicken is 
pointy for M. (Cytowic, 1993). Other rare cases lead to proprioceptive experiences, which 
involve movement and bodily postures  (Devereux,  1966, quoted in Cytowic,  1989).  In 
cases of ordinal linguistic personification, numbers or days of the week are associated with 
personality traits, emotions or gender (e.g., Smilek et al., 2007-a). In addition, most often, 
synesthetic experiences come with an emotional dimension, besides the sensory one (see 
Hochel et al., 2008, for a discussion). 
There is variation among individuals not only in the kinds of stimuli that elicit synesthetic 
experience (often labeled “the inducer”, see Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001), but also in 
the kind of experience that is elicited (the “concurrent” or “synesthetic” experience). For 
instance, people do not report the same colors for all letters and numbers: J can be blue for 
some and orange for others. There are, however, some general trends (e.g., see Rich et al., 
2005). These recurrent patterns across individuals reveal for instance that A is most often 
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red  across  multiple  color-graphemes  synesthetes  (Day,  2005;  Simner  et  al.,  2005)  and 
vowels tend to elicit  more luminous and intense colors than consonants (Smilek et al.,  
2007-b; Spence & Deroy, forthcoming-a and Deroy & Spence, submitted, for a discussion). 
Still,  these  trends  do  not  exhaust  the  richness  of  individual  experiences:  the  overall 
vividness and intensity of synesthetic experience varies from one person to the other. Some 
investigators wonder whether some of these variants do not deserve to be recognized as 
distinct kinds on their own. For the various cases labeled as synesthetic might, in fact, be 
underlain  by very  distinct  processes,  some of  which have  little  or  nothing to  do  with 
sensory  perception  (see  Simner,  2007,  2011,  and Marks,  2011,  for  a  review of  recent 
debates). 
Large-scale studies (e.g., Day et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2006) reveal that grapheme-color 
and word-color cases are in a significant majority. Why? The question is not disconnected 
from the previous one, as the frequency might be due to the fact that synesthesia is a too 
encompassing category,  where further sub-species have to be recognized. Several other 
divisions have been introduced, that could help explain away the dominance of linguistic-
color synesthesia and cut down the category into more finely individuated types. 
1.2. Individuating the various types of synesthesia 
Ramachandran  and  Hubbard’s  (2001-a)  distinction  between  “lower”  and  “higher” 
synesthetes  for  instance  might  prove  useful  to  break  synesthesia  into  finer  categories. 
Lower synesthetes are sensitive to the basic sensory features of the inducer (e.g., contrast, 
lines and orientation of the letter on the page) whereas higher synesthetes are sensitive to 
the kind of object they recognize (A’s and B’s for instance)3. Dixon et al. (2004) have also 
proposed a sub-categorization of synesthetes into “associators”, who are the majority and 
experience the atypical color in an internal space (in the “mind's eye”, as they report) and 
the rare “projectors” for whom the atypical color appears to be “out there”, for instance 
overlaying the letter on the page. Resorting to such categorization matters, as projectors 
have often provided the core of philosophical challenges due to their perceptual-like spatial 
experiences (e.g., Macpherson, 2007; Wager, 1999). 
These divisions may not, however, be sharp (see Simner, 2011), as synesthetes fall on a 
continuum on both the high-low scale and the associator-projector one. In addition, the 
frontier between “higher” versus “lower” synesthetes is quite permeable, as it is unclear 
how independent  higher  synesthetic  experiences  are  from variation  in  the  more  basic 
features  of  the  tokened type.  Subtle  color changes  in  synesthetic  experiences  arise  for 
instance when small changes in font are introduced: although ‘R’ and ‘r’ are tokens of the 
same type and might both appear orange, the hue of orange one of them elicits may be 
brighter or more saturated than the other. Moreover, the transfer of synesthetic experiences 
from one type of alphabet to another – which, at first sight, can be taken for a sign that  
higher synesthesia is at stake – is shown to also depend on phonemic and visual similarities  
between the letters (Witthoft & Winawer, 2006). Finally, Hubbard et al. (2005) and Brang 
et al. (2011) have cast further doubt on the isolation of higher synesthesia, by showing that 
the visual form of letters may have an impact on their coloring: letters that are closer in 
shape  (e.g.,  KVWXY)  may  be  closer  in  color  than  those  that  differ  in  shape  (e.g., 
CUDOQ). Similar questions arise for the projectors versus associators divide. Ward et al. 
(2007, 2010) showed, for instance, that the degree of projection varies with the task. In 
addition, Edquist et al.’s (2006) study revealed that some synesthetes are left out by this 
3Note that this is orthogonal to the problem of knowing whether synesthesia is stimulus-
driven or internally-driven. Even for lower synesthetes, the basic sensory features might 
have to be recognized before they trigger the synesthetic experience.
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categorization, as some grapheme-color synesthetes are neither associators, nor projectors. 
For them, the colors are extended but not in any particular location, that is, neither in the 
mind’s eye, nor out there. More importantly, there might not be such clear empirical cases 
of perfect projectors consistently having synesthetic experiences of color patches with a 
determined extension and localization (Hupe et al., 2011).
To summarize, understanding synesthesia supposes that one has a clear sense of what its 
various types are. But research still struggles to encompass individual variations. Finding 
the  right  sub-categories  constitutes  a  pressing  challenge,  as  researchers  feel  that  their 
object is always one step ahead, challenging the bases on which they approached it, and is 
“so large and agile” that it eludes them (Marks, 2011, p. 48). 
1.3. Is synesthesia a case of “atypical perception”?
The most pressing issue is to define the nature of these atypical experiences. A frequent 
interpretation is that synesthetic experiences are all instances of perception: synesthesia is 
said  to  occur  when  “stimulation  of  one  sensory  modality  automatically  triggers  a 
perception in a second modality, in the absence of any direct stimulation to this second 
modality” (Harrison et Baron-Cohen, 1997, p. 3, italics are our emphasis). This definition 
is  widely  quoted  and often  endorsed  in  the  literature  (e.g.,  Baron-Cohen et  al.,  2007; 
Macpherson, 2007). Elsewhere, synesthesia also gets defined as “the stimulation of one 
sensory modality reliably caus(ing) a perception in one or more different senses” (Cytowic, 
1995) or as an “anomalous sensory perception” (Asher et al., 2009).
Yet,  one  might  immediately  object  that  synesthesia  cannot  really  count  as  perceptual 
because it  is not  veridical (Gray, 2001-a) or caused by the presence of the appropriate 
stimulus (Sagiv et al., 2011). Lycan (2006) and Fish (2010) both recommend, for instance, 
synesthetic  experiences  to  be treated as  cases of  hallucination,  whereas  Simner (2007) 
insists  that  it  is  a  higher  cognitive-linguistic  phenomenon.  The  characterization  of 
synesthesia as being perceptual certainly depends first on how one captures the synesthetic 
experience, and second on how one defines perception, noticeably regarding its correlation 
with the external world. These are the issues which will be addressed in the two subsequent  
sections.
2. What is it like to have a synesthetic experience?
2.1. Are synesthetic and non-synesthetic experiences subjectively distinguishable?
A first question to ask is whether synesthetic experiences are subjectively indistinguishable 
from  perceptual  experiences.  Note  that  from  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  the 
indistinguishability is not sufficient to claim that synesthetic experiences should count as 
perceptual  (as  noticeably  pressed  by  disjunctivist  accounts,  see  Logue,  this  volume). 
However, there is a widespread agreement, coming from the argument of hallucination, 
that if an experience is subjectively distinguishable from a perceptual one, by being for 
instance not vivid or devoid of phenomenal presence, it is enough to declare that it is not 
perceptual (see Crane, 2011, for a discussion).
The reports from synesthetes do not deliver a straightforward answer: synesthetes often say 
that  they  are  aware  of  a  difference  between  their  synesthetic  and  non-synesthetic 
experiences while these two also seem to them comparable. The documented reports and 
various observations converge to stress that a synesthetic experience can be as vivid and 
forceful  as  other  experiences  induced  by  other  kinds  of  stimuli,  and  that  it  can  also 
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spontaneously lead to beliefs – for instance, the belief that B2 is genuinely green (Cytowic, 
1993).  Such  synesthetic  experiences  seem  comparable  to  perceptual  experiences.  In 
addition, synesthetic experiences are also atypical, i.e., not shared by the majority of the 
population.  This  atypicality  can  explain  why  a  synesthete  distinguishes  between  his 
idiosyncratic synesthetic experience and beliefs, which nobody shares, and the other set of 
experiences which lead to commonly accepted beliefs.
However, being rare and not being shared are not good reasons to consider a certain kind 
of experience as being non-genuinely perceptual. Take for instance what happens in taste 
perception: very few persons are super-tasters and perceive or believe that Brussels sprouts 
are unbearably bitter. The rare character of the former experience doesn’t  rule  out that 
super-tasters perceive certain tastes. Likewise,  the idiosyncratic difference exhibited by 
synesthetic experiences is not sufficient to say that they are not perceptual.
The atypical character of synesthetic experiences must be handled with care, especially 
because  rarity  is  sometimes  taken  to  be  a  definitional  feature  of  the  condition  (e.g., 
Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001). Indeed, synesthetic experiences do not seem to be so 
frequent,  but  this  does  not  help determining their  nature.  The unusual  character  rather 
comes from having, to put it in general terms, a certain “extra” by comparison with the 
class of experiences which is otherwise normally triggered by the same stimuli in the same 
conditions. Synesthetic experiences then are atypical in the sense that they are anomalous. 
They differ from what we otherwise suppose to be the rules of normal perception. The 
important remaining difficulty that we address in the subsequent section is to capture these 
very peculiar experiences.
2.2. A frequent confusion about the inducer-concurrent pairings
Understanding  the  “extra”  which  constitutes  the  synesthetic  experience  proves  highly 
problematic. Reports from synesthetes stress how difficult it is to communicate on private 
experiences, especially when they are unusual. As one of them describes: “I have trouble 
putting into words some of the things I experience. It is like explaining red to a blind 
person or middle-C to a deaf person” (Cytowic, 1989). Thus, when D. reports having the 
experience of a “pretty yellow green” when she hears a B2 and of a “dirty yellow-green” 
when hearing a D# (Ortmann, 1933), we can wonder what she means here by the term 
“green”? Does it mean the same thing as when D. reports that a certain leaf looks green? 
The worry here is not merely linguistic: it matters whether or not her synesthetic sensations 
of green are identical to her non-synesthetic ones, for which she uses the same descriptor. 
It is generally agreed that terms used to report synesthetic experiences can be taken at face 
value and used to think about the “extra” as being more or less similar to the kind of 
experience otherwise described by the terms. Synesthetic reports are then usually analyzed 
into two lists of separate components: one corresponds to this extra experience, on which 
the synesthete is asked to report, and the other corresponds to the inducer, which can be 
manipulated externally. In a very general way, experimental researches consist in varying 
the  inducer  and  measuring  the  modifications  on  the  side  of  the  concurrent.  What  is 
misleading  then  is  certainly  not  this  method  of  squaring  reports  within  such  inducer-
concurrent pairs, but the kind of interpretation it encourages. There is, as we want to point 
out, a method-content confusion, going from the testing of synesthesia through associated 
pairs to the idea that synesthetic experiences themselves are a pair of experiences. 
The notion of an atypical synesthetic concurrent often transfers to the idea that synesthetic 
experience is a conjunction of two distinct experiences: the concurrent would be enjoyed 
Synesthesia    6
by  synesthetes  only  whereas  the  inducer  would  be  common  to  synesthetes  and  non-
synesthetes alike. An illustration of this transfer can be found in Macpherson (2007) when 
she recommends changing Cytowic’s  description  of  synesthesia  as  a  “startling  sensory 
blendings whose quality seems difficult for most of us to imagine” (Cytowic 1997, p.17) to 
the claim that synesthetes have an “additional experience” joined to the otherwise normal 
experience common to us all.  Synesthesia, she admits,  corresponds to cases where “an 
experience  or  element  of  experience  is  associated  with some sensory  modality  and  is 
distinct  from”  the  former  (trigger)  experience  (Macpherson,  2007,  p.  70).  Keeley 
(forthcoming)  also  notes  that  “in  synesthesia,  it  is  not  the  case  that  the  neurotypical 
sensations are replaced or eclipsed by the synesthetic ones; instead they are experienced in 
a conjoint fashion” (see also Wager, 1999).
A synesthetic experience where, for instance, a green concurrent is induced by a sound is 
understood as leading to the typical experience of the sound, plus the unusual experience 
of green. This view constitutes what we call a “dualistic model” of synesthesia. This model 
is largely assumed both in the scientific and philosophical literature. Yet, we argue, it is a 
disputable and possibly distorting way of capturing the atypical experiences documented in 
the empirical literature, as there are good reasons to theorize about these experiences in a 
non-dualistic way. 
2.3. Synesthetic experiences and phenomenal enrichment 
Most  of  the  reports  do not  imply that  synesthetes  have  an extra  experience. They are 
perfectly compatible with the more minimal and cautious idea that synesthetic experiences 
come with a richer sensing, that is, some extra-sensational aspect. Dualistic models infer 
too quickly that this richer sensing means that synesthetes enjoy another experience with a 
distinct content and character, which can be unproblematically defined and detached from 
the  other  contents  and  characters  of  the  overall  experience.  Therefore,  a  crucial  point 
behind these  dualistic  models  is  that  synesthetic  experience  divide  into  two otherwise 
normal experiences, or at least that a shared normal perception will appear once the extra-
experience is left out of the picture. This possibility, we argue, is at odds with the evidence.
The first point comes from the internal dependence of the synesthetic extra on the content 
of another experience. We contend that the concurrent is never experienced in the way the 
fuller experience which seems to be reported would be. It is noticeably never experienced 
by itself, but always as grafted onto the content of another experience. We should not be 
misled  here  by  descriptions  that  make  them  analogous  to  classical  experiences  –  for 
instance of color stains or sounds. Take the report that the letter E is loud: how can one 
have a sensation of loudness in the absence of other perceived properties such as pitch and 
timbre, which are not attributed to E? Synesthetic colour is often just an addition of hue to 
a grapheme. But there is no non-synesthetic experience of hue without spatial location, or 
without variations in saturation, lightness, etc., that is, in the absence of precise localization  
and other spatial and qualitative properties. In synesthetic experience, the extra is all in the 
phenomenal character, and akin to the enrichment of the existing character: it falls short of 
being the possible content of a distinct, normal experience. 
A second argument against dualism comes from the strong connection that exists, within 
experience,  between the synesthetic  extra  and the content of  perception  relative to  the 
inducer.  The  available  evidence  actually  goes  against  the  independence  claim.  On the 
contrary, it inclines to treating the concurrent as interacting, or rather interfering, with the 
inducer, and this at rather early stages of the perceptual process. This is true for instance 
for perceived localization,  as measured through what  is  called “pop-out” effects:  when 
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asked to localize a target object (for instance, the black digit 2) among several distracting 
objects  (for  instance  black  digits  5),  some of  the  synesthetes  who  experience  red  2’s 
perform  faster  than  non-synesthetes.  The  red  color  of  the  2’s  allows  them  to  easily 
distinguish  the  2’s  from  the  5’s,  whereas  the  typical  experience  of  non-synesthetes 
constraints them to a longer serial search (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001-b)4. Here the 
extra  facilitates  the  localization  of  black  digits  (as  would  do  adding  colors  to  the 
graphemes for a non-synesthete).
Interferences with the identification of perceived objects have also been demonstrated by 
some variants of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). The original task revealed that people take 
longer to name the color of a written word if the ink does not match the word than if the 
two match. For example, it takes longer to name the color green when it is printed on the 
word “red” than when it is printed on the word “green”. A similar effect is observed when 
grapheme-color  synesthetes  are  asked  to  name  the  actual  color  of  a  grapheme  while 
ignoring the synesthetic color it  elicits. If the letter R is synesthetically experienced as 
orange, synesthetes will be slower in naming the ink’s color when the letter is printed in 
blue than when it is orange (e.g. Mills et al., 1999)5. These results underscore what we 
have already suggested: the concurrent and the experienced inducer are rather two aspects 
of the same  experience, intricately connected and difficult to disentangle when asked to 
attend selectively to one of them.
Insisting that the concurrent is not distinct from and merely conjoined to the content of an 
otherwise perceptual experience provides a good reason to stand back from the dominant 
dualistic models. At the same time, more needs to be done to account for the atypical 
insertion  of  this  synesthetic  extra  which  closely  interacts  with  the  other  experienced 
contents. Drawing on Evans’ (1982) distinction between the richness (i.e., the number of 
distinct  dimensions)  and  the  fineness  of  grain  (i.e.,  the  number of  distinct  perceptible 
positions  on each dimension),  we contend that  the concurrent  only  exists  as  an  extra-
dimension, that is an enrichment of other contents. This preserves the idea of a supplement, 
while not granting any real or theoretical independence to the concurrent as a separate or 
detachable experience.  Another,  closely related way to conceptualize its relation to the 
perceptual experience of the inducer is to think about the experience hosting a form of 
parasitic phenomenal character. 
Recognizing that synesthesia consists in the occurrence of atypical, enriched experiences 
finally leaves us with an appropriate answer to the subjective indiscriminability question: 
the concurrent does not need to be granted with a perceptual status on its own, but it  
inherits the same subjective perceptual reality as the overall experience which it comes to 
enrich.
4   It should be mentioned that several studies (e.g., Palmeri et al., 2002; Sagiv et al., 2006-
b;  Smilek et  al.,  2001)  showed that this  synesthetic  pop-out  effect  needs to  be further 
qualified. Although fast,  it  does not happen instantaneously, suggesting that synesthesia 
occurs early in perceptual processing, but not prior to attention.
5These results, like in the classical task, remain ambivalent as to whether the interference 
occurs at the perceptual level (e.g., the letter E is automatically perceived by the synesthete 
to  be  red,  and  this  perceived  redness  interferes  with  the  “true”  color  which  is  also 
perceived)  or  at  the  semantic  level  (the  synesthetic  experience  of  red  makes  one 
automatically tag the concept red, and this concept slows down one's ability to access the 
concept of the “true” color). Note that we are not saying that these results are sufficient to 
demonstrate  a  perceptual  interference  but  that,  in  combination  with  other  results,  they 
provide cumulative evidence for the interference occurring, at least partly, at the level of 
perceptual experience. 
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3. Synesthetic experiences and perception 
Are synesthetically enriched experiences fully perceptual? The question continues to make 
sense if one considers that the issue is not settled only at the phenomenological level that 
was  described  in  the  former  section.  Besides  having  a  certain  phenomenal  character, 
perception is usually granted with three other key features: it co-varies with changes in the 
physical environment, it represents an object and finally, it recruits certain specific organs 
and brain areas.
Addressing the  perceptual  status  of  synesthesia  requires  one to  verify how synesthetic 
cases fit with these requirements. Before handling this problem, it is important to underline 
that  each  is  the  topic  of  vibrant  disputes.  For  instance,  some  take  the  presence  of 
phenomenal character to be a contingent feature of perception (see Prinz, this volume), as 
perception  extends to  unconscious  cases.  The requirement  that  perception  causally  co-
varies with external features might have to be relaxed to accommodate the perception of 
high-level properties or of interoception.  The idea that perception is representational is 
widely  accepted  by  representationalist  and  intentionalist  accounts,  but  enactivists  and 
direct realists will relax or give it up (see Jacob, this volume, for an elaboration of this 
point). Finally, accepting that perception maps onto specific brain areas is in line with most 
contemporary physicalist sympathies, but it can be relaxed or given up by functionalist and 
non-physicalist  accounts (for different reasons such as multiple realizability in the first 
case and metaphysical dualism in the second). The goal of the last part of this chapter is 
not  to  argue  about  which  criteria  should  be  included  or  prevail  in  the  definition  of 
perception,  but  to  assess  the  perceptual  status  of  synesthesia  in  light  of  each of  these 
requirements.
3.1. The co-variation criterion
What determines the occurrence and the nature of synesthetic experiences? Addressing this 
question is fundamental if one requires perceptual states to be environment-driven and not 
mind-driven. A perceptual state, such as hearing a sound, is indeed  caused by physical 
stimulation and its content  co-varies with changes in the environment. Certain cases of 
synesthesia resemble such states by being triggered by physical stimuli and varying with 
their  properties.  For instance D., the synesthete described in Ortmann's  (1933) detailed 
single-case study,  has  synesthetic  experiences  that  vary with properties  of  the auditory 
stimuli.  Difficulties  come from less  straightforward  cases  for  which  the  nature  of  the 
correlated experience appears to be mind-dependent. These cases occur mainly either when 
there is independence of the synesthetic experiences from certain variations in the external 
stimulus or when there are synesthetic experiences in the absence of an external stimulus. 
These two cases need to be considered independently. 
As  was  said  earlier,  the  dominant  type  of  synesthesia  consists  of  colors  elicited  by 
graphemes. Such synesthetes can be sensitive to the tokening of a certain type of letter or 
word,  while  being  relatively  indifferent  to  more  minute  changes  in  their  physical 
instantiation (see 1.2). These so-called higher synesthetes respond in approximately similar 
ways to a wide range of physical stimuli as long as they fall in the appropriate kind. For 
instance  some  of  them have  the  same  synesthetic  experience  with  auditory  or  visual 
instantiations of the letter R and, in the latter case, for letters printed in different fonts. 
Recent evidence additionally reveals that such synesthetic experience can rapidly transfer 
to new fonts, that is, to previously non-experienced sets of physical features presented or 
identified as members of a previous kind of letter (Mroczko et al., 2009). 
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It is worth stressing that, from a philosophical point of view, the existence of such pure 
higher synesthetes, if any, does not necessarily lead to the rejection of the perceptual nature 
of  synesthesia.  The  fact  that  a  state  responds  to  high-level,  and  not  merely  physical, 
properties does not necessarily mean that it cannot be perceptual. Some have argued (see 
Bayne, 2009; Siegel, 2006) that being an A, like being a tiger, a pine-tree or an R can be 
part of the perceptual content. This, in turn, needs to be separated from the question of 
whether this kind of property needs to be conceptually recognized (as accepted for instance 
in Simner, 2007, but see Deroy, forthcoming, for a discussion).
More serious worries come from cases where a conceptual or an emotional mental state 
suffices to trigger a synesthetic experience. Dixon et al. (2000) report the case of C, a digit-
color synesthete who has a colored experience of numbers not only when viewing the 
external stimuli but also when conceptually entertaining them. In their experiment, C was 
presented with mathematical additions, such as ‘5+2’, followed by a colored patch which 
was either congruent or incongruent with the color that C associates with the result of that 
sequence (i.e., 7). In this variant of the Stroop task, C had to name the color of the patch 
before  reporting  the  arithmetic  solution.  The  results  revealed  slower  responses  for 
incongruent colors than for congruent ones (for instance when the patch is yellow and 
seven is associated to that color in C's synesthetic repertoire). What matters here is that the 
immediate cause of the synesthetic experience cannot be the physical sensory stimulation, 
(i.e., the digit resulting from the addition), as the number 7 was never presented. 
This kind of experiment confirms the possibility for automatic synesthetic experiences to 
be both mind-driven (here by a mental calculation) and object-driven (whether physically 
present low-level features or higher-order types such as a numeral). However, it should be 
mentioned that cases of purely mind-driven synesthetic experiences, that is, cases which 
would  only  be triggered by mental representation of an object – and  not by its physical 
presentation – are yet to be found. In the meantime, internally-driven cases seem to exist 
only as an interesting extension – but  extension nonetheless – of the externally-driven 
ones. 
It  is  therefore  premature  to  say  whether  internal  determinants  such as  concepts  are  in 
themselves sufficient to elicit  synesthetic experiences (see Spiller & Jansaria, 2008, for 
more data) and what role they play alongside necessary physical stimuli,  in explaining 
some variations and occurrences of synesthetic experiences. It is fair to say that for a vast 
majority  of  cases,  including  for  higher  synesthesia,  the  presence  of  external  physical 
stimuli and an independent object remains a necessary condition, and that its properties 
explain the variations and distribution of the synesthetic experiences obtained. 
3.2. The representational criterion 
It is possible to go beyond covariation to saying that perceptual states  represent a mind-
independent  object  (or  property).  Again,  we  will  pass  on  many  of  the  discussions 
surrounding the formulation of this definitional requirement and examine synesthesia only 
in  the  context  of  the  idea  that  perceptual  states  have  a  certain  representational  (or 
intentional) content in virtue of their phenomenal character. For instance, the perceptual 
state of experiencing blue represents the property of being blue. To maintain this relation, it  
is necessary that the phenomenal character supervenes on the representational content; in 
other terms, that the phenomenal character is determined by what is experienced. As Tye 
puts it, “necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in 
their phenomenal character” (Tye, 2002, p. 137). 
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At first sight, synesthetic cases seem contradict this form of representationalism. This is 
illustrated by Wager's (1999) case of Cynthia, a colored-hearing projector synesthete who 
experiences a determinate shade of red at a precise location when she hears middle-C. 
What Cynthia's synesthetic experience represents is arguably middle-C. In the absence of 
any phenomenal enrichment,  middle-C is also the only thing that is represented by the 
normal  auditory  experience  of  Norma.  There  is  therefore  a  difference  in  phenomenal 
character without any difference in intentional content (see also Rosenberg, 2004, for a 
similar  objection).  Note  that  Cynthia  is  more  of  an  ideal  case,  given  that,  as  was 
mentioned, pure projectors might not exist. There is therefore a worry that such a case, and 
its  further  variations  (Wager,  1999,  2001;  Gray,  2001-a)  brings  the  debate  away  from 
empirically  valid  objections,  and  joins  thought-experiment  challenges  to 
representationalism, such as the inverted spectrum case (Block, 1978). That being said, 
let’s pursue the argument. 
As  was  underscored  by  Lycan  (2006)  and  by  Wager  (1999)  himself,  the  objection  is 
directed against externalist representationalist theories, like Dretske's (1995, 2000) or Tye’s 
(2000) which require that the intentional object (represented in perception) is identical to 
the  physical  object.  An  internalist  account  has  no  problem  in  saying  that  Cynthia's 
experience  represents  both  middle-C and redness,  although this  implicitly  lead  him to 
endorse the (ortherwise misleading) dualist view: in that case, as Lycan (2006) puts it, 
“vision is telling her that there is redness dead ahead, just as in the cases of after-images 
and hallucinated rodents”. What the internalist account needs to explain then is what makes  
one  aspect  of  the  experience  true  and  the  other  one  false,  given  that  the  two  are 
subjectively  indistinguishable  (contrarily  to  after-images).  Our  account  in  terms  of 
enriched experiences might make this task less easy than the dual one, for their unique 
content will have to have the same veridicality conditions. 
From an externalist perspective, though, the objection does not seem fatal. As pressed by 
Alter  (2006),  an  externalist  does  not  need  to  claim  that  every  phenomenal  difference 
introduces a difference in representational content. Both a tactile sensation and a visual 
sensation can represent an external object, although the two feel different (see Tye, 2000, 
for a defense of this view on behalf of representationalism). The same kind of phenomenal 
character  can go  in  various  guises,  and representationalists  who accept  this  claim can 
interpret Cynthia’s synesthetic experiences as being just a declination within the general 
kind of “experiencing middle-C”. Her experience will then represent middle-C and so does 
a non-synesthetic experience, as much as the look of a cube and the tactile feel of a cube 
can represent the property of being cubic.
This line of reply turns out to be problematic though in the synesthetic case, at least in the 
sense  that  it  conflicts  with  another  frequent  representationalist  credo:  the  transparent 
character  of  experience.  The  transparency  claim  goes  further  than  the  basic 
representationalist  supervenience claim. The latter  merely posits  that states which have 
similar kinds of intentional content are alike in kinds of phenomenal characters; whereas 
transparency means that the phenomenal character is  identical to the intentional content. 
Obviously then,  if  the  phenomenal  character  is  richer  in  the synesthetic  experience  of 
middle-C, the intentional content of that experience must certainly be richer as well. But in 
which sense does an experience of red middle-C represent more of the external object than 
the  non-synesthetic  experience  of  middle-C?  No  further  attribute  of  the  object  seems 
captured in the synesthetic experience. The fact that the same attributes can be represented 
faster  does  not  introduce  a  difference  in  content,  despite  the  suggestion  offered  by 
Sollberger (forthcoming) to rescue representationalism from synesthesia’s challenge. 
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The challenge synesthesia raises for representationalism certainly goes beyond this rapid 
overview. It seems fair to conclude that the challenge is serious and that synesthesia is 
difficult to square with the representationalist’s requirements for perception. Each solution 
raises problems: first, if one claims that synesthetic experiences represent a non-existent 
intentional object – or misrepresent the existing one – then synesthetic experiences end up 
amounting to hallucinations or illusions. This is at odds with the idea that they behave like 
perceptual experiences and follow systematic co-variations with the external environment 
(as described in 3.1), as the empirical evidence yet supports. If synesthesia is an illusion, it 
is  a  very  specific  one,  for  which  we  need  a  better  definition.  Alternatively,  the 
representationalist can choose to accommodate synesthetic experiences within the range of 
possible variations in the way a certain object is represented in perception. But the stretch 
might  be  difficult:  very  different  phenomenal  characters  have  to  represent  the  same 
external object; up to the extent that a synesthetic experience of an orange sound represents 
the properties of a sound as does a strictly auditory experience. The final option opened to 
the representationalist is to show that the enriched synesthetic experiences have a richer 
representational content than the non-synesthetic ones. This is an interesting, but difficult 
route to explore if synesthesia were to count as perceptual.
3.3. The sensory processing criterion
Turning  to  neurological  criteria,  synesthesia's  perceptual  status  raises  further  concerns. 
Certain physicalist accounts are happy to think that kinds of mental states also correspond 
to kinds of neurological states. Perceptual states, in that sense, can be defined as those 
resulting from the activation of specific brain areas (sensory ones). How easy is it to apply 
this criterion to synesthetic states? As this field of research is fast moving, we will only  
offer  a  succinct  review  of  the  key  data,  while  focusing  on  their  consequences  for 
physicalist requirements.
Brain imaging studies have revealed that synesthetic experiences correlate with some co-
activation of sensory brain areas. When synesthetes hear one of the sounds that trigger 
colors for them, there is an increased activity in the area in the fusiform gyrus known as V4 
or V8, that is, the brain areas involved when non-synesthetes perceive colors. Interestingly, 
such increased activation does not occur in non-synesthetes trained to associate sounds 
with colors and who are subsequently asked to visually imagine the corresponding color 
when hearing the sound (Nunn et al., 2002). Other – non strictly sensory – areas of the 
brain also show specific patterns of activation in some synesthetes (i.e., parietal and frontal 
regions, see Rouw & Scholte, 2007). Synesthesia is likely to be defined in more general 
terms as an increased cortical connectivity between various sensory brain regions, either 
directly  or  indirectly  (via  the  mediation  of  non-sensory  processing).  Whether  indirect 
activation  and  top-down  influences  mean  that  synesthesia  cannot  count  as  sensory  is 
controversial  (see  Simner,  2007,  for  a  discussion).  Further  questions  then  arise  as  to 
whether the increased connectivity comes from a lack of inhibition or from an abnormal 
increase in connectivity (see Bargary & Mitchell,  2008, for a review). In any case, the 
localization of the activity turns out to be less crucial than finer structural or functional 
differences. 
 
More recently, doubts have also arisen as to whether shared localization in V4/V8 means 
that the same kinds of neurons are active in synesthetic color-enriched auditory experience 
and non-synesthetic color experiences. A study by Van Leuwen (2010) revealed that the 
neurons involved in synesthetic experiences do not show the same patterns of suppression 
through repetition as the ones involved in typical perception, concluding that “the neural 
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correlates of synesthetic color experience and real color experience are not fully shared” 
(Van Leuwen, 2010; see also Hong & Blake, 2008, for further discussion). This questions 
how thinly or broadly the kinds of physical processes have to be individuated; in other 
words, is shared localization sufficient, and which additional aspects have to be included? 
Further neuroscientific investigation of synesthesia is certainly needed, and speculation is 
here useless. It is yet worth noting that resorting to a neurological or physicalist definition 
to defend the fact that synesthesia is  a form of perception might turn out to lead to a 
Pyrrhic victory, finally challenging the way one thought about the nature and individuation 
of sensory areas in the first place. This leads us to the final conclusive remarks.
4. Conclusions and further challenges 
Every paper on synesthesia must end up on a cautious note, given the obvious need for 
further exploration. Substantial steps can yet be made, and are worth debating, on the basis 
of revised assumptions. We have shown in the first part of the chapter that the unity of the 
condition  should  not  be  taken  for  granted,  and  that  many  cases  fall  under  the  word 
“synesthesia”  for  reasons  that  need to  be  clarified.  This  variety  might  be  a  legitimate 
concern for a neurological definition of synesthesia (Simner, 2011). Yet there is still room, 
or so we argue, to think about synesthesia not just as  ad-hoc set of cases as long as one 
focuses on two things:  thinking about  the proper individuation of the various types of 
synesthesia  and looking for  a overall  definition of synesthesia  in  terms of  the kind  of 
mental  states  (and in  this  case  characteristic  kind of experiences)  it  gives rise  to.  The 
second part of the chapter is our attempt to provide such a definition. Although more needs 
to be done, it seems important to move away from a method-content confusion and from 
dual models of synesthetic experiences. Synesthetic experiences can be defined as richer, 
unified experiences, where an additional sensory attribute (or qualia) gets hosted in the 
content of perception. How does this bear on the third assumption, that synesthesia teaches 
us something more general about the mind, and more specifically about perception? No 
simple answer can be provided, but several things need to be distinguished.
On the one hand, the rejection of the dual model is particularly important, as it pushes 
away the idea that synesthesia challenges functionalism. As Gray has put it on multiple 
occasions (Gray et al., 1997, 2002, 2006) synesthesia might seem to refute the claim that 
experiences  with  different  functional  properties  necessarily  have  different  qualitative 
properties  –  a  claim  which  holds  at  least  for  strong  versions  of  functionalism,  (see 
Macpherson,  2007;  see  also  Block,  1980  and  Shoemaker,  1975,  for  more  general 
discussions). 
The objection only works under the view that a colored-hearing synesthete is in the same 
kind of conscious mental state (e.g., experiencing red) when she sees a cherry and when 
she hears a certain sound. This understanding is ruled out once synesthesia is interpreted, 
as we suggest it should be, in a non-dualistic way. Gray’s premise that synesthetic and non-
synesthetic  experiences  (say  of  the color  red)  have a  shared  content  rests  on the dual 
experience  model  we  have  rejected.  Once  synesthetic  experiences  are  understood  as 
phenomenally enriched experiences, there is no such thing as a single kind of content (red) 
that could be detached and compared across synesthetic and non-synesthetic experiences. 
The background premise is blocked and the challenge therefore does not hold6. 
6 Our goal here is not to defend functionalism, be it its strong or weak versions, but to  
stress that synesthesia does not constitute an empirical objection to this model. 
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If synesthesia does not in itself provide good reasons to give up functionalism, why is it so 
challenging? A main challenge,  as  we have seen in  part  3,  is  to  see whether  enriched 
synesthetic experiences deserve to  be classified as perceptual.  As was stressed,  several 
conditions need to be considered besides the fact that they enjoy the same conscious status 
as perceptual experiences before they can be granted with a full perceptual status. These 
conditions  involve  the  extent  to  which  these  experiences  co-vary  with  the  external 
environment,  the  kind  of  representational  content  they  come  to  have  and  their 
neurophysiological correlates. Given the data currently available, it is certainly difficult to 
confirm that  all  these requirements  are  met,  or  that  they are met  by all  types actually 
considered as being synesthetic. 
For the sake of the argument, let us postulate that some cases of synesthesia fulfill all these 
conditions. Granting that there are cases of synesthetic perception, what do they teach us 
about  typical,  i.e.  non-synesthetic,  perception? Two attitudes can be adopted  here:  one 
granting that synesthesia is continuous or analogous to non-synesthetic perception and the 
other, that it remains an idiopathic, isolated condition. This dilemma is what we expect to 
be  synesthesia's  core  challenges.  Saying that  synesthetes  and non-synesthetes  are  on a 
continuum leads to the problem of theorizing the “more or less” synesthetic aspect of all 
perception, whereas saying that it is perceptual but distinct from typical perception will 
oblige to think about perception as coming in very distinct kinds. These two very distinct 
routes leave us to explore perception as a more varied or more disunified phenomenon than 
what was, and often still is, assumed.
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